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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the opening scenes of Director Steven Spielberg’s Indiana Jones 
and the Last Crusade, the movie’s namesake hero, a young Indiana Jones 
fights to reclaim a long-lost golden crucifix, once owned by 16th century 
Spanish explorer Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, from a thief.1  Before 
attempting to reclaim the cross from the thief, Jones argues the point that 
curators, cultural heritage enthusiasts, and perhaps even the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States would all agree with: “It 
belongs in a museum!”2  Echoing Dr. Jones’s sentiment, the Seventh 
Circuit recently held in Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran that a collection 
of Persian antiquities, comprised of thousands of ancient and inscribed 
stone tablets, should remain in the collection of the University of 
Chicago’s Oriental Institute.3  However, unlike Jones’ attempt to keep the 
artifact from a thief, the court kept American victims of terrorist activity 
from seizing the tablets in order to satisfy legal judgments won against 
Iran.4 
Over the last two decades, U.S. courts have ruled that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran owes victims of state-sponsored terror nearly a billion 
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 1.   INDIANA JONES AND THE LAST CRUSADE (Lucasfilm Ltd. 1989). 
 2.   Id.  Later in the film, when the thief again reclaims the golden cross from Jones the line is 
repeated.  Id. (“That belongs in a museum!”). 
 3.   Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 488–89 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in 
part, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017). 
 4.   Id. at 473–75. 
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dollars in compensatory and punitive damages.5  Collecting the judgment 
amounts from Iran, however, remains an ongoing battle for most terror-
victim plaintiffs.6  Because Iran does not recognize the default judgments 
that U.S. courts have awarded these plaintiffs, the terror victims must 
instead attempt to recover the damages by attaching Iranian property, held 
within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, to their judgments against Iran.7  This 
property includes blocked financial assets that American companies and 
banks owe Iran, as sought by the plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit case 
Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Persian antiquities sought by 
the plaintiffs in Rubin.8 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”) generally 
provides immunity from suit to foreign sovereigns, as well as immunity 
from attachment of their property in executing U.S. court judgments 
against them.9  However, FSIA provides limited exceptions to such 
immunity if the sovereign in question sponsored terrorist activity that is 
the basis of an American plaintiff’s claim against them.10  If an exception 
applies, plaintiffs may attach property that belongs to the foreign sovereign 
and is located within the jurisdiction of American courts.11  The Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits have disagreed over the proper interpretation of the 
statute applying the state-sponsored terror exception to the usual immunity 
from attachment, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g).12  While the Ninth 
Circuit held in Bennett that § 1610(g) is a “freestanding immunity 
exception,” allowing terror victims to attach “any and all Iranian property 
[located] in the United States,” a panel of the Seventh Circuit disagreed.13  
In Rubin, the Seventh Circuit panel countered that § 1610(g) simply makes 
it easier for victims to seize particular “commercial use” property, 
designated elsewhere in § 1610, but not any kind of Iranian property they 
                                                            
 5.   See, e.g., Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2016) (calculating 
that “[c]ollectively, the judgments [against Iran in suits pertaining to state-sponsored terrorism] total 
nearly $1 billion.”). 
 6.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 473. 
 7.   See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 49–58 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (explaining the difficulty of enforcing judgments against Iran and attempts to seize Iranian 
assets in numerous state-sponsored terrorism claims cases). 
 8.   See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 474; Bennett, 825 F.3d at 957. 
 9.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 476–78; see also Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1602–11 (2012). 
 10.   See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605A, 1607 (2012). 
 11.   See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012). 
 12.   See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487; cf. Bennett, 825 F.3d 949; see also infra Part II.B. 
 13.   Bennett, 825 F.3d at 959, 966, 969 (Benson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
see also Rubin, 830 F.3d at 473. 
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choose.14  The panel’s decision created a circuit split and sought to 
overrule two prior Seventh Circuit cases, creating a novel procedural issue 
outside the scope of this Comment.15 
The circuit split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits is becoming 
increasingly prominent in the United States’ foreign affairs.  With the 
recent passing of the Justice Against State Sponsors of Terror Act 
(“JASTA”), Saudi Arabia is now considered a sponsor of terrorist acts 
occurring on U.S. soil for supporting the September 11th terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center in New York.16  JASTA provides victims of 
the attacks and their families a cause of action to sue Saudi Arabia for 
damages.17  With a growing number of potential plaintiffs able to bring 
                                                            
 14.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 473–74. 
 15.   Because the majority panel opinion in Rubin “both create[d] a circuit split and overrule[d], 
in part, two recent decisions” of the Seventh Circuit, the Circuit’s procedural Rule 40(e) would 
normally be triggered.  Rubin, 830 F.3d at 489 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).  Rule 40(e) requires that: 
[a] proposed opinion approved by a panel of [the Seventh Circuit] adopting a position 
which would overrule a prior decision of this court or create a conflict between or among 
circuits shall not be published unless it is first circulated among the active members of this 
court and a majority of them do not vote to rehear en banc the issue of whether the position 
should be adopted. 
7TH CIR. R. 40(e).  In this case, however, five active judges, a majority, recused themselves, making 
it “impossible to hear [the] case en banc” or even to circulate the opinion as required.  Rubin, 830 F.3d 
at 489 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).  Neither the panel, nor Judge Hamilton, in dissent, indicated why the 
judges recused themselves, but “at least three of them have close ties to the University of Chicago.”  
Noah Feldman, Ancient Treasures Shouldn’t Be Compensation for Terror Victims, BLOOMBERGVIEW 
(July 25, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-25/ancient-treasures-
shouldn-t-be-compensation-for-terror-victims.  While this novel situation has the potential to cause 
procedural wrinkles for the Seventh Circuit in the future, these issues are outside the scope of this 
Comment’s analysis.  See Eric Pearson, Coming Up Short: When There Aren’t Enough Judges Eligible 
to Rehear a Case En Banc, JD SUPRA (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/coming-
up-short-when-there-aren-t-19641/ (suggesting the novelty of not having enough eligible judges to 
rehear a case en banc). 
 16.   Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016) (to 
be codified, in part, at 28 U.S.C. § 1605B) [hereinafter JASTA].  See also Patricia Zengerle, Senate 
Passes Bill Allowing 9/11 Victims to Sue Saudi Arabia, REUTERS (May 17, 2016, 10:38 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-usa-congress/senate-passes-bill-allowing-9-11-victims-to-
sue-saudi-arabia-idUSKCN0Y8239. 
 17.   JASTA, § 3, 130 Stat. at 853 (codified 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(c)).  JASTA has proven 
controversial because of concerns that other nations may deny the United States immunity from suit 
in response.  See, e.g., Scott Horsley & Alisa Chang, Congress Overrides Obama’s Veto On Sept. 11 
Lawsuit Bill, NPR (Sept. 28, 2016, 3:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/09/28/495709481/sept-11-
lawsuits-vote-today-could-be-first-reversal-of-an-obama-veto.  This Act marked Congress’s only 
override of a veto made by President Barrack Obama in his two-term presidency.  Jennifer Steinhauer 
et al., Congress Votes to Override Obama Veto on 9/11 Victims Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/us/politics/senate-votes-to-override-obama-veto-on-9-11-
victims-bill.html?_r=0.  President Obama called the bill a “dangerous precedent” and a “mistake,” 
indicating that the Act’s potential aftermath could be harmful to diplomatic relations between the U.S. 
and a number of foreign entities.  Id.; see infra note 217 and accompanying text. 
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lawsuits under FSIA’s terrorism exceptions, the need to clarify the scope 
of attachable property in these suits is more pressing than ever. 
This Comment addresses the appropriate application of § 1610(g).  
Based on statutory construction, legislative intent, the propriety of 
overruling Seventh Circuit precedent, and public policy concerns, courts 
should not interpret § 1610(g) of FSIA as a freestanding immunity 
exception for attachment of any property belonging to state sponsors of 
terrorism.  Instead, Courts should follow the Seventh Circuit and interpret 
§ 1610(g) to ease the attachment requirements for certain property which 
has a “commercial use,” as designated elsewhere in § 1610.18 
Part II of this Comment will provide background information relevant 
to examining the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ conflicting interpretations 
of § 1610(g).  Part III will analyze both decisions and argue that federal 
courts should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of § 1610(g), as 
described in Rubin, because of the statute’s language and principles of 
statutory construction, legislative intent, and public policy concerns.  
Finally, Part IV will describe the ways the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
could be implemented in the future. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Like any story of artifact seizure or protection, the history of the 
Bennet and Rubin cases and laws governing both is multi-faceted and full 
of twists, turns, and pitfalls.  This part will introduce the practice of foreign 
sovereign immunity and the history of protecting international cultural 
property in the United States in Part II.A.1 and 2.  Next, Part II.A.3 will 
explain the origins of FSIA and its statutory exceptions.  Finally, Part II.B 
will discuss the Seventh and Ninth Circuits decisions creating a split over 
the function of FSIA § 1610(g), the state-sponsored terror exception to 
foreign sovereign immunity from the attachment of property to execute 
judgments made by U.S. courts. 
                                                            
 18.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 481–84. 
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A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Cultural Property, and FSIA in the 
U.S. 
1. The History of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States 
Granting “foreign sovereign immunity” is the practice of allowing 
foreign nations or governments to avoid lawsuits filed against them in U.S. 
courts.19  Providing foreign sovereigns immunity from American judicial 
proceedings is “a matter of grace and comity rather than a constitutional 
requirement,” but has a longstanding history in the United States.20  In 
1812, Chief Justice John Marshall explained the purpose of providing 
foreign sovereign immunity: to maintain the “perfect equality and absolute 
independence of sovereigns, and th[e] common interest impelling them to 
mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each 
other . . . .”21  Congress did not formally regulate the practice of providing 
foreign sovereign immunity until the passage of the FSIA.22  The FSIA 
formalized the general provisions of foreign immunity U.S. courts 
previously developed in the common law and included exceptions to 
granting immunity in particular circumstances.23 
2. Protection and Immunity of International Cultural Property in the 
United States 
Just like the deeply rooted practice of providing foreign sovereigns 
immunity from suits in U.S. courts, the United States has also 
demonstrated a strong desire to protect various forms of cultural property 
                                                            
 19.   See E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rules as to Immunity of Foreign 
Sovereigns from Suit in Federal or State Courts, 25 A.L.R.3d 322, 322 (2016). 
 20.   Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Republic of 
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004)); see generally Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 
116 (1812) (providing immunity to France in order to protect a French warship visiting U.S. ports due 
to storm damage, and establishing the practice of providing foreign sovereigns immunity in the U.S.); 
Michael A. Tessitore,  Immunity and the Foreign Sovereign: An Introduction to the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 73 FLA. B.J. 48, 48–50 (1999) (providing a brief history of foreign sovereign immunity 
in the United States). 
 21.   Schooner, 11 U.S. at 137. 
 22.   Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–11 (2012)); see also Tessitore, supra note 20, 
at 48. 
 23.   See Tessitore, supra note 20, at 48 (“The FSIA essentially codified the restrictive theory of 
immunity and established a comprehensive framework for resolving claims of immunity in any civil 
action against a foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.”); see also 
infra Part II.A.3. 
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in the United States and around the world in many ways, particularly in 
the last several decades.  This concept has long had appeal in American 
pop culture.24  The U.S. government has also often manifested a strong 
desire to promote preservation and display of historical documents, sites, 
and cultural property, both at home, through entities like the National 
Archives, the Smithsonian Institution, and National Park Service, and 
abroad.25  Additionally, Congress passed the Mutual Educational and 
Cultural Exchange Act in 1961, establishing the Bureau of Education and 
Cultural Affairs and the Fulbright Scholarship Program.26  Congress 
intended, in part, 
to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating 
the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements 
of the people of the United States and other nations . . . and thus to assist 
in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations 
between the United States and the [rest of] the world.27 
In addition to supporting educational purposes, protecting antiquities 
of international importance supports U.S. foreign relations efforts.  For 
example, in 2016, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha 
Power invited ambassadors from fifteen different countries, including 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Qatar, Senegal, and Palestine, to view 
an exhibit of Turkic artifacts on display at the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art in New York City.28  While viewing the exhibit, Powers “hope[d] the 
                                                            
 24.   Many American books and films sensationalize real or fictional protectors of historically 
and culturally important artifacts.  See, e.g., MONUMENTS MEN (Columbia Pictures & Babelsburg 
Studio 2014) (based loosely on the actual stories of American military men reclaiming art looted by 
Nazis during WWII, as chronicled in ROBERT M. EDSEL & BRET WITTER, MONUMENTS MEN: ALLIED 
HEROES, NAZI THIEVES, AND THE GREATEST TREASURE HUNT IN HISTORY (2007)); NATIONAL 
TREASURE (Walt Disney Pictures 2004) (lead characters seek to find and protect a fabled “national 
treasure” trove based on clues left in America’s founding documents); RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK 
(Lucasfilm Ltd. 1981) (lead character, Indiana Jones, attempts to prevent Nazis from seizing the long 
lost Ark of the Covenant). 
 25.   See, e.g., NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) 
(providing information about the National Archives, which houses, displays, and preserves America’s 
“Founding Documents”); NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/index.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 
2017) (providing links to the 413 different “areas” that the National Park Service maintains); Our 
Mission, SMITHSONIAN INST., https://www.si.edu/About/Mission (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) (listing 
“[v]aluing [w]orld [c]ultures” as one of their “[p]riorities” and “[s]haping the future by preserving our 
heritage, discovering new knowledge, and sharing our resources with the world” as their “[v]ision”). 
 26.   Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, Pub. L. 87-256, 75 Stat. 527 (1961) 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2451). 
 27.   Id. § 101, 75 Stat. at 527. 
 28.   Pamela Falk, Museum Diplomacy: Could Islamic Art Inspire Middle East Peace?, 
OBSERVER (June 16, 2016, 10:15 AM), http://observer.com/2016/06/museum-diplomacy-could-
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historic artworks would provide the edification needed to soften the tone 
of regional discord” between many of the nations whose ambassadors 
attended.29  There are numerous examples of “museum diplomacy,” as 
well as attempts to maintain diplomatic relationships through lending 
artifacts to, and borrowing artifacts from, institutions all over the world 
for display.30 
The first codification of cultural property protection in the United 
States was the Lieber Code in 1863.31  Later, in 1954, the United States 
signed the international Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict, which sought to “take all 
possible steps to protect cultural property” of other nations because of its 
“great importance for all peoples of the world.”32  Most recently, in 2016, 
Congress enacted the Protect and Preserve International Cultural Property 
Act to better “protect and preserve international cultural property at risk” 
in war-torn Syria.33  Additionally, under the Immunity From Seizure Act 
(“IFSA”), passed in 2012, foreign artifacts “of cultural significance” 
                                                            
islamic-art-hold-the-key-to-peace-in-the-middle-east/. 
 29.   Id. 
 30.   See, e.g., Cristina Ruiz, Curators as Kissingers: Can Museums Repair Diplomatic 
Relations?, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 17, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/119884/how-museums-
became-diplomatic-fixers (discussing museums serving as international diplomats, including the 
example of an exhibit in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi); see also Laina C. Lopez, Article: Art Loans 
by Foreign Countries, FOREIGN SOVEREIGN BLOG (Oct. 29, 2013), 
http://www.foreignsovereignblog.com/article-art-loans-by-foreign-countries/ (discussing the legal 
implications of art loans between the United States and foreign countries). 
 31.   The Lieber Code arose out of the American Civil War and sought to protect “charitable 
institutions, collections, and works of art” from destruction by military forces during warfare.  Patty 
Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime Against Property or a Crime Against 
People?, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 338–39 (2016) (describing the Lieber Code’s 
inclusion in an 1863 U.S. Army Field Manual). 
 32.   Elizabeth Varner, The Art of Armed Conflicts: An Analysis of the United States’ Legal 
Requirements Towards Cultural Property Under the 1954 Hague Convention, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
1185, 1188–89 (2011) (quoting Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240).  The U.S. Senate ratified the 1954 Hague 
Convention in 2009.  Id. at 1187.  One explanation is that Congress feared the Hague Convention, 
unlike prior international treaties aiming to protect cultural property, would impose on the United 
States an affirmative duty to protect cultural property in occupied areas from destruction by third 
parties.  See id. at 1187–88. 
 33.   Protect and Preserve International Cultural Property Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-151, 130 
Stat. 369 (2016).  Additional laws that protect international cultural property in the United States 
include: the 1970 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s Convention on 
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 27 U.S.T. 37, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (international agreement seeking to 
protect cultural property from theft and other “illicit” means of acquisition or sale of property), and 
the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act of 1983, Pub. L. 97-446, 96 Stat. 2329 
(1982) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–13 (2012)) (ratifying the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention to better address archeological pillaging). 
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temporarily loaned and imported to the United States for any non-profit 
“cultural exhibition, assembly, activity, or festival” hosted by any 
“educational institution” may be immune from “any judicial process” 
imposed by U.S. courts under particular conditions.34  However, if these 
conditions are not met and the loaning state is deemed a sponsor of terror, 
plaintiffs may seek to attach cultural property under FSIA in support of 
execution of U.S. judgments.35 
3.  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
Congress passed the FSIA in 1976 to illuminate “clearer standards for 
resolving immunity questions”36 and “to free the Government from the 
case-by-case diplomatic pressures” that arose in the courts.37  The FSIA 
dictates that foreign states, or their agencies and instrumentalities, are 
immune from the jurisdiction of both U.S. federal and state courts in 
almost all civil cases, but provides limited exceptions.38  Section 1610 of 
FSIA designates exceptions to immunity from property attachment, 
including providing for “state-sponsored terrorism” exceptions.39 
FSIA’s first state-sponsored terror exception to immunity was enacted 
in 1996.40  The original version of the exception was repealed and replaced 
                                                            
 34.   22 U.S.C. § 2459(a) (2012).  To receive immunity under IFSA, the “President or his 
designee” must (1) find an object is “of cultural significance,” (2) find that the activity within the U.S. 
is “in the national interest,” and (3) publish a notice indicating the findings in the Federal Register 
prior to importing the object.  Id.  If these conditions are met, any cultural object temporarily within 
U.S. jurisdiction may be immune from attachment.  Id. 
 35.   See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012); see also Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 
473–79 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017). 
 36.   Tessitore, supra note 20, at 49 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 
480, 488 (1983)). 
 37.   Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488 (providing an overview of FSIA’s purposes). 
 38.   28 U.S.C. §§ 1604–1611 (2012).  Exceptions include § 1605 (providing general exceptions 
to foreign sovereign immunity, including commercial interactions) and § 1605A (providing an 
exception to foreign sovereign immunity for state-sponsored terror claims). 
 39.   Exceptions to allowing state terror sponsors attachment immunity are 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7)  
(2012) (state property “used for a commercial activity in the United States”), § 1610(b)(3) (pursuant 
to property of agencies or instrumentalities of state terror sponsors “engaged in commercial activity 
in the United States”), and § 1610(g) (as discussed in Part II.A.3.a.i).  Other exceptions include § 
1610(a)(1) (when a foreign state possessing property for commercial use waives their immunity), § 
1610(a)(2) (when attached property “is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim 
[was] based”), § 1610(a)(3)–(4) (when claims are related to property rights), § 1610(a)(5) (when 
claims are based on contractual agreements), and § 1610(a)(6) (when arbitral awards are related to the 
attached property). 
 40.   Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 
Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996).  The statute allowed U.S. citizens who were victims of terrorist activity 
supported by foreign sovereigns to sue for compensatory damages based on their injuries.  However, 
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to clarify a number of issues and is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A 
and referred to as the “Flatow Amendment,” and was passed in response 
to a terror attack involving Iran.41  The Flatow Amendment allows 
plaintiffs to seek punitive damages, along with compensatory damages, in 
suits against state terror sponsors.42  These plaintiffs faced many 
procedural challenges in filing suits against Iran.43  Even when plaintiffs 
were able to overcome the initial hurdles, most faced even more difficulty 
when attempting to recover their court ordered judgments.44  The court in 
In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation attributed this 
difficulty to three primary factors: (1) the scarcity of “Iranian Government 
assets within the jurisdiction of United States Courts,” (2) the immunity of 
many of the remaining Iranian assets located in the United States, and (3) 
the U.S. federal regulatory control of many of the assets attributed to state 
                                                            
the statute did not specify whether it “served as a basis for an independent federal cause of action 
against foreign state sponsors of terrorism” themselves, or merely provided causes of action against 
state officials, employees, and agents of a foreign state; nor did it specify if parties with state-sponsored 
terror claims could seek compensatory and punitive damages.  In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism 
Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 42–43 (D.D.C. 2009).  The FSIA’s current state-sponsored terrorism 
exception clarifies these issues.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (repealed 2008); see also In re Islamic 
Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 40–43. 
 41.   See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1998), abrogation 
recognized in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Civ. No. 98-3096 
(TFH), 2007 WL 1876392 at *4 (D.D.C. June 28, 2007). 
 42.   28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012).  Congress passed the amendment in 1996 in response to an 
incident that later became the cause of action in Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 6; see also In re Islamic 
Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 41–46.  The plaintiff, Stephen Flatow, 
participated in the passing of the Flatow Amendment and later filed suit on behalf of himself and his 
daughter, Alisa, under the provision.  Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 6–11.  Alisa Flatow died from severe 
injuries caused by an Iran-funded suicide bombing on the Gaza Strip in 1995.  Id.  Flatow was the first 
case decided against Iran under the new Flatow Amendment and the FSIA state-sponsored terror 
exception.  The D.C. District Court held that Iran owed Mr. Flatow approximately $247.5 million in 
compensatory and punitive damages.  In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 
at 44–45.  The court also held that the state-sponsored terror exception and the Flatow Amendment 
“collectively established both subject matter jurisdiction and federal causes of action for civil lawsuits 
against state sponsors of terrorism.”  Id. at 44.  The court, like Congress, displayed hope for the 
“popular sentiment” that “terrorism victims were going to ‘sue the terrorists out of business.’”  Id. at 
45 (internal citations omitted). 
 43.   Applying the Flatow Amendment, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held in Cicippio-Puleo 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran that the amendment only created “a cause of action against . . . officials, 
employees, and agents” of a foreign state, but not against a state itself.  353 F.3d 1024, 1035–36 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original).  Because of this, plaintiffs with claims pertaining to state-sponsored 
terror began to seek causes of action under state tort law from the states in which they were domiciled 
at the time of the terror attack.  In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 46–
48.  This was successful in some cases, but entirely precluded many other plaintiffs from finding relief 
in states without an appropriate or applicable statutory cause of action.  Id. 
 44.   See, e.g., In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 49 (listing prior 
cases in which plaintiffs attempted to attach Iranian assets, in addition to the consolidation of cases at 
issue in the case itself). 
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sponsors of terror and located in the United States.45  Receiving the 
judgment amount directly from the Iranian Government was improbable 
because the Government had never appeared in any FSIA terrorism 
action.46  This led plaintiffs to “locate and attach Iranian Government 
assets in aid of execution of their civil judgments,” a Herculean feat in 
light of the scarcity of such assets in the United States.47  The scarcity of 
Iranian assets within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts arises primarily from 
the 1979 Iranian Hostage Crisis and its aftermath.48  Most Iranian assets 
remaining in the United States after the resolution of the Crisis were 
“subject to a dizzying array of statutory and regulatory authorities,” and 
with a tense political relationship between the United States and Iran, 
plaintiffs had few options for attachment.49  To combat what one court 
deemed “the never-ending struggle to enforce judgments against Iran,” 
Congress passed several pieces of legislation, including Section 201 of the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (“TRIA”), Section 1083 of the 2008 
National Defense Appropriations Act (“2008 NDAA”), and Section 502 
of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012.50 
Section 201 of TRIA allows terror victims to satisfy their judgments 
by seizing assets that belong to state sponsors of terror, but are frozen or 
seized by the U.S. government, “notwithstanding any other provision of 
law.”51  TRIA explicitly excludes “property . . . used exclusively for 
                                                            
 45.   Id. at 62; see also infra note 48 (explaining federal regulation of Iranian assets in U.S.). 
 46.   Id. at 43 n.5 (explaining that “[w]hile Iran has not defended itself in any of the lawsuits 
under the terrorism exception, Iran has on occasion come to court to prevent plaintiffs from collecting 
on default judgments entered under that provision.”). 
 47.   See id. at 49–50 (providing an overview of the Iranian Hostage Crisis and its role in limiting 
Iranian assets in the U.S.). 
 48.   In response to the Iranian capture of the U.S. embassy and embassy personnel in Tehran in 
November 1979, President Carter froze all Iranian assets located within the United States.  Id.  The 
crisis was eventually resolved by the signing of the Algiers Accords in 1981, in which Iran agreed to 
return the American hostages in exchange for an agreement that the U.S. would unfreeze Iran’s assets.  
Id. at 50.  Both nations also agreed to settle all litigation between their governments and “any 
outstanding litigation between the nationals of the two countries.”  Id.  The United States was further 
required to return Iranian assets held in American banks.  See id. (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
453 U.S. 654, 665–66 (1981) (validating the President’s executive orders implementing the provisions 
of the Algiers Accords)). 
 49.   Id. at 52. 
 50.   Id. at 49–62; Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
158, § 502, 126 Stat. 1214, 1258 (2012) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (2012)); 2008 National Defense 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338 (2008) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1605A, 1610 (2012)); Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 
2322, 2337 (2002) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012)). 
 51.   See TRIA § 201(a). 
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diplomatic or consular purposes” from attachment.52  Section 8772 of the 
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, codified at 
22 U.S.C. § 8772, was the key statute at issue in the recent Supreme Court 
case Bank Markazi v. Peterson.53  The Court held that 22 U.S.C. § 8772 
made about $1.75 billion in Iranian assets held in a New York bank 
specifically available to “partially satisfy judgments gained in separate 
actions by over 1,000 victims of terrorist acts sponsored by Iran,” 
including the plaintiffs in the Rubin case discussed in Section II.B.2.54  
While the defendants argued that § 8772 was unconstitutional for violating 
the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches, the 
majority of the Court disagreed and upheld the legislation.55  In effect, the 
Court’s decision indicates that Congress may intervene to designate 
particular assets for attachment in cases related to victims of state-
sponsored terror.56 
The effect of Section 1083 of the 2008 NDAA was much broader than 
either TRIA Section 201 or Section 502 of the Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights Act.57  The primary results of Section 1083 were the 
re-codification of the Flatow Amendment as 28 U.S.C. § 1605A and the 
addition of language to § 1610, including subsection 1610(g), for 
“Property in Certain Actions.”58 
The Flatow Amendment, or § 1605A, is the current exception to 
sovereign immunity for state sponsors of terrorism, and it expressly creates 
a federal cause of action allowing victims of terror to sue state sponsors of 
terror directly.59  Generally, to file suit under § 1605A: (1) the terror victim 
must be a U.S. national,60 (2) the nation sued must be recognized as a “state 
sponsor of terrorism” by the U.S. Secretary of State, prior to or resulting 
                                                            
 52.   Id. § 201(d)(2)(B)(ii); see also Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 287 F. Supp. 2d 608, 609–
10  (D. Md. 2003), aff’d, 376 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that property once occupied by Iranian 
diplomats was not attachable under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002). 
 53.   See 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1314–16 (2016). 
 54.   Id. at 1316; see also infra Section II.B.2. 
 55.   See id. at 1322–29. 
 56.   See id. 
 57.   See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 58–62 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(explaining the effect of 2008 NDAA § 1083). 
 58.   See id. (explaining the effect of 2008 NDAA § 1083); 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1610 (2012); see also discussion infra Section II.A.3.(a).i. 
 59.   28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1), (c); see supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 60.   § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)–(III).  Members of the U.S. military and U.S. government 
employees or employees acting under a contract awarded by the U.S., attacked while within the scope 
of his or her employment, may also sue under § 1605A.  Id. 
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from the basis of the plaintiff’s claims,61 and (3) the designated state 
sponsor of terrorism must be responsible for the “personal injury or death 
[of the plaintiff] caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft 
sabotage, [or] hostage taking,” or for providing “material support or 
resources for” the act which provides the basis for the plaintiff’s claim.62  
In addition to defining when plaintiffs may bring suits against state 
sponsors of terror, § 1605A(g) establishes a lien against certain property 
in judicial proceedings against the sued state as soon as plaintiffs file 
notice of the proceeding.63  The lien is established against “any real 
property or tangible personal property” which is (1) subject to attachment 
in order to satisfy a judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1610, (2) located 
within the judicial district of the filing, and (3) titled “in the name of any 
defendant,” or essentially property of the foreign sovereign being sued.64 
Section 1610 includes exceptions to foreign immunity from 
attachment of assets in aid of execution of judgments entered by U.S. 
courts.65  Congress intended to combat “the inability of plaintiffs to 
execute their civil judgments against Iran” by adding language to the 
section as part of the 2008 NDAA.66  Section 1610(a) lists the kinds of 
attachable property used for “commercial activity” by terror sponsors on 
American soil, and most importantly denies immunity from attachment to 
such property when the judgment against the state relates to “claim[s] for 
which the foreign state is not immune under” the state-sponsored terror 
exception, § 1605A.67  Section 1610(b)(3) also denies immunity from 
attachment to agencies or instrumentalities of states designated as 
sponsors of terror under § 1605A.68  Several courts maintain that § 
1610(b)(3) includes state instrumentalities generally considered 
“juridically separate,” or apart from a state’s underlying government for 
the purposes of suit, in order to “avoid the injustice that would result from 
                                                            
 61.   § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)–(II).  The State Department designated Iran a state sponsor of 
terrorism on January 19, 1984.  State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (last visited Oct. 5, 
2017), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.  Iran currently maintains this designation, along with 
Syria and the Sudan.  Id. 
 62.   § 1605A(a)(1). 
 63.   § 1605A(g)(1). 
 64.   § 1605A(g)(1)(A)–(C). 
 65.   28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012). 
 66.   In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 62 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 67.   § 1610(a)(7).  Thus, if a state is deemed a state sponsor of terror, and therefore barred from 
immunity under § 1605A, property owned by that state, located in the United States, and used for 
some commercial purpose is not immune from attachment in claims brought against the state on the 
basis of terrorism related activity.  Id. 
 68.   § 1610(b)(3). 
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permitting a foreign state to reap the benefits of [American] courts while 
avoiding the obligations of international law.”69 
Section 1610(g), titled “Property in Certain Actions” also pertains 
directly to states denied immunity under the Flatow Amendment.70  While 
the court’s opinion in In re Islamic Republic of Iran Litigation indicated 
that § 1610(g) was “plainly intended to limit the application of foreign 
sovereign immunity . . . to attachment or execution with respect to 
property belonging to designated states [sic] sponsors of terrorism,” the 
court also found that the “full implications of § 1610(g) [were] far from 
clear.”71  Section 1610(g)(1) reads: 
(1)  In general . . . the property of a foreign state against which a judgment 
is entered under section 1605A, and the property of an agency or 
instrumentality of such a state, including property that is a separate 
juridical entity or is an interest held directly or indirectly in a separate 
juridical entity, is subject to attachment in aid of execution, and 
execution, upon that judgment as provided in this section, regardless of– 
(A) the level of economic control over the property by the government of 
the foreign state; 
(B) whether the profits of the property go to that government; 
(C) the degree to which officials of that government manage the property or 
otherwise control its daily affairs; 
(D) whether that government is the sole beneficiary in interest of the 
property; or 
(E) whether establishing the property as a separate entity would entitle the 
foreign state to benefits in United States courts while avoiding its 
obligations.72 
Subsections 1610(g)(1)(A)–(E) are often referred to as the “Bancec 
factors.”73  Courts derived the Bancec factors from the Supreme Court’s 
                                                            
 69.   First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 634 (1983) 
[hereinafter Bancec] (holding that in suits against state-sponsors of terror, disregarding the “normally 
separate juridical status of a government instrumentality” is justifiable to promote fairness and justice); 
see infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text. 
 70.   § 1610(g). 
 71.   In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 62. 
 72.   § 1610(g)(1). 
 73.   See, e.g., Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 482 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted 
in part, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017) (citing Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1071 n.9 
(9th Cir. 2002); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375, 1380–82, 
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opinion in First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior 
De Cuba (Bancec).74  The Bancec doctrine created a “general presumption 
that a judgment against a foreign state may not be executed on property 
owned by a juridically separate agency or instrumentality,” but included 
two distinct exceptions to this immunity when “the sovereign and its 
instrumentality are alter egos or if adherence to the rule of separateness 
would work an injustice.”75  In applying Bancec, courts created a list of 
five general factors to determine if an exception applied to a juridically 
separate agency or instrumentality.76  Those factors include: 
(1) The level of economic control by the government; 
(2) whether the entity’s profits go to the government; 
(3) the degree to which government officials manage the entity or 
otherwise have a hand in its daily affairs; 
(4) whether the government is the real beneficiary of the entity’s 
conduct; and 
(5) whether adherence to separate identities would entitle the foreign 
state to benefits in United States courts while avoiding its obligations.77 
In interpreting § 1610(g), both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
recognized Congress’s intent to mirror the Bancec factors in § 
1610(g)(1)(A)–(E).78 
Section 1610(g)(2) governs assets that qualify under subsection (1), 
but are blocked by the U.S. government specifically under the Trading 
With the Enemy Act or the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act.79  Finally, § 1610(g)(3) governs potential third-party joint property 
                                                            
1380–81 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
 74.   Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626–29; see also Rubin, 830 F.3d at 481–86. 
 75.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 481–82 (citing Bancec, 462 U.S. at 628–33); see also Flatow, 308 F.3d 
at 1071 n.9. 
 76.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 482 (citing Flatow, 308 F.3d at 1071 n.9; Walter, 965 F.2d at 1380–82, 
1380 n.7) (explaining that “[s]oon after Bancec was decided, the federal courts began to coalesce 
around a set of five factors for determining when the exceptions applied”). 
 77.   Id. 
 78.   See Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2016) (comparing § 
1610(g) and Bancec); Rubin, 830 F.3d at 483 (indicating that the strong similarity in language between 
the Bancec factors and § 1610(g)(1) was intended to “abrogate the Bancec doctrine for terrorism-
related judgments”). 
 79.   28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(2) (2012) (“United States sovereign immunity inapplicable. Any 
property of a foreign state, or agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, to which paragraph (1) 
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holders, who may be non-liable under the suit and inappropriately 
punished if certain property is seized.80 
In the past, § 1610(g) was consistently used by the courts to punish 
state sponsors of terrorism because it allows for the attachment of certain 
assets “regardless of factors that would ordinarily insulate such assets in 
other contexts governed by § 1610(a) or (b).”81  However, other courts, 
including the Fourth Circuit, have held that a “plain reading of § 1610(g) 
offers no indication that Congress intended to eliminate the immunity that 
has long been afforded to diplomatic properties, like Iran’s former 
embassy here in the United States . . . .”82  Currently, the courts in the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits have conflicting interpretations of § 1610(g).83  
The Ninth Circuit held that § 1610(g) is a “freestanding exception” to 
immunity, making any property attachable under § 1610(g), regardless of 
the commercial use requirements of § 1610(a) and (b).84  Conversely, the 
Seventh Circuit said § 1610(g)’s only purpose is to remove the Bancec 
                                                            
applies shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or execution, upon a judgment 
entered under section 1605A because the property is regulated by the United States Government by 
reason of action taken against that foreign state under the Trading With the Enemy Act or the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act.”). 
 80.   § 1610(g)(3) (“Third-party joint property holders.—Nothing in this subsection shall be 
construed to supersede the authority of a court to prevent appropriately the impairment of an interest 
held by a person who is not liable in the action giving rise to a judgment in property subject to 
attachment in aid of execution, or execution, upon such judgment.”); see also Weinstein v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 831 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  In Weinstein, American victims of Iranian, North 
Korean, and Syrian terrorist acts sought to seize IP addresses owned jointly by those nations and the 
U.S. based Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) to satisfy default 
judgments against the nations.  Id. at 473–77.  The court held that while § 1610(g)(1) might allow for 
the attachment of any applicable property, § 1610(g)(3) protects the property interests of a third-party 
owner if those interests are particularly strong and the third-party was in no way related to the terror 
acts.  Id. at 486. 
 81.   Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 576 (7th Cir. 2014), overruled by Rubin, 830 
F.3d at 487; see also Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 331, 343 (7th Cir. 2015), overruled by 
Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487 (upholding the understanding of § 1610(g) provided in Gates). 
 82.   In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 102 (D.D.C. 2009); see 
also Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 287 F. Supp. 2d 608, 609 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d on other 
grounds, 376 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that property once occupied by Iranian diplomats was 
not attachable under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, and further unattachable under FSIA); 
Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 604 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 618 F.3d 19 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (holding § 1610(g) does not indicate that “diplomatic properties are [] subject to 
attachment”). 
 83.   Bennett, 825 F.3d at 960; Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487–88. 
 84.   Bennett, 825 F.3d at 960; see also Weinstein, 831 F.3d at 483 (“Once a section 1605A 
judgment is obtained, section 1610(g) strips execution immunity from all property of a defendant 
sovereign.”); Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props., 830 F.3d 107, 123 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(“Section 1610(g) strips FSIA attachment immunity from the property of a ‘foreign state’ or of its 
‘agency or instrumentality’ if the underlying judgment was entered under § 1605A’s terrorism 
exception.”), cert. denied, Alavi Found. v. Kirschenbaum, 137 S. Ct. 1332 (2017). 
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considerations required to attach property under § 1610(a) and (b) in 
claims related to state-sponsored terror.85 
B.  Bennett and Rubin: Opposing Readings of § 1610(g) in the Ninth 
and Seventh Circuits 
This section reviews the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ opinions in 
Bennett and Rubin.  Section B.1 will outline the facts and litigation history 
of Bennett and the Ninth Circuit’s analysis and holding in the case.  
Section B.2 will describe the facts of the Rubin case, with emphasis on the 
Persepolis Collection, the litigation history of the case, and the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis and holding. 
1.  Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran 
a.  Facts and Litigation History 
In Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Michael and Linda Bennett 
filed suit on behalf of their daughter, Maria, a student at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem in Israel.86  While Maria attended the University 
in 2002, an offshoot of Hamas, a terrorist organization supported by Iran, 
bombed the cafeteria, fatally injuring Maria and other students.87  In 2007, 
a district court ruled the Bennetts were entitled to almost thirteen million 
dollars in damages from Iran, based on Iran’s role in the terror attack.88  
Over the next several years, the Bennetts unsuccessfully attempted to 
attach Iranian assets pursuant to the 2008 additions to FSIA § 1610 to 
satisfy their judgment.89  These assets included the former Iranian 
Embassy, which the courts refused to attach for diplomatic reasons.90  
Eventually, the Bennetts sought to attach approximately $17.6 million 
which U.S. based companies, Visa, Inc. (“Visa”) and Franklin Resources, 
Inc. (“Franklin”), owed to Bank Melli, the largest financial institute in and 
considered an instrumentality of, Iran.91  Visa and Franklin owed Bank 
Melli funds under a contract involving the use of Visa credit cards in 
                                                            
 85.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487. 
 86.   Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 507 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122–23 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 87.   Id. 
 88.   Id. at 130. 
 89.   Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 604 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 618 F.3d 
19 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 90.   Id. 
 91.   Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 957 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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Iran.92  The district court held these funds were attachable under section 
201(a) of TRIA, because the funds sought were frozen by the U.S. 
government, and under § 1610(g) of the FSIA.93  The defendants, 
including Bank Melli, appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where a three-judge 
panel heard the appeal, two judges affirming the district court’s ruling and 
one concurring in part and dissenting in part.94 
b.  The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis and Ruling 
The two judges affirming the district court first held that TRIA § 
201(a) was an appropriate means to attach the funds sought because the 
funds were blocked by the U.S. government.95  The court also held that 
Bank Melli, an “instrumentality” of Iran, was not immune to attachment 
because the underlying claim arose as a result of state-sponsored terror.96  
The majority next considered the potential attachment of the Visa and 
Franklin funds under § 1610(g).97  While the panel in dicta 
“acknowledge[d] that § 1610 as a whole [was] ambiguous,” it nevertheless 
held that § 1610(g) was a freestanding exception to immunity from 
attachment of assets in claims arising under § 1605A and incidents of state 
sponsored terror.98  In effect, this holding would mean that any property 
of Iran, or an entity of Iran, is attachable under § 1610(g).  The Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation markedly diverged with the United States’, as 
amicus curiae, interpretation of § 1610(g).99  The United States argued 
“section 1610(g) is not a freestanding exception to immunity that can be 
invoked independent of the rest of section 1610.”100  In other words, the 
United States argued that § 1610(g) simply eases the requirements for 
property attachable under other subsections of the rule, particularly § 
                                                            
 92.   Id. 
 93.   Id.; Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 927 F. Supp. 2d 833, 845–46 (N.D. Cal. 2013); see 
also supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text (discussing TRIA § 201). 
 94.   Bennett, 825 F.3d at 954. 
 95.   Id. at 957–58. 
 96.   Id. at 958. 
 97.   Id. at 958–64. 
 98.   Id. at 961. 
 99.   Id. at 961 n. 7; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party at 10, Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2016) (Nos. 13-15442, 13-
16100) (“[I]f a plaintiff covered by section 1610(g) wishes to attach the assets of a state agency or 
instrumentality, and the plaintiff can find an exception in section 1610 that would apply but for the 
fact that the plaintiff holds a judgment against the state itself—rather than an entity that would be 
considered legally distinct—the plaintiff would be able to proceed.”). 
 100.   See id. at 8. 
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1610(a) and (b) when the claims are against state terror sponsors.101 
Disagreeing with the United States’ interpretation, the court first 
contended that “Congress was referring to, and abrogating,” not only the 
presumption that instrumentalities were generally immune from suits 
against the state to which they were an instrumentality, but also the usual 
application of the Bancec factors to instrumentalities.102  The majority held 
that § 1610(g) “contain[ed] a freestanding provision for attaching and 
executing against assets of a foreign state or its agencies or 
instrumentalities,” regardless of the requirements of any other subsection 
of § 1610, including the requirements for revoking immunity for property 
used for, “commercial activity” in § 1610(a) and (b).103  The court stated 
that § 1610(g) dealt with subject matter distinct from other parts of the 
section because “[§ 1610(g)] applies only to ‘certain actions,’ specifically, 
judgments ‘entered under section 1605A.’”104  Indicating “the 
particular . . . controls over the general,” the panel thus held that by 
applying § 1610(g), attachments need not meet the “commercial use” 
requirements in subsections (a) or (b) and in effect, indicated that any 
property could be seized pursuant to § 1610(g), regardless of its 
characteristics of uses.105 
Next, the court determined that “as provided in this section” referred 
only “to procedures contained in” the subsection of § 1610 directly 
preceding § 1610(g), but not to § 1610 as a whole or other provisions 
within the FSIA.106  The preceding subsection, § 1610(f), allows for the 
attachment of certain blocked assets of state sponsors of terror.107  The 
                                                            
 101.   Id. 
 102.   Bennett, 825 F.3d at 959. 
 103.   Id. 
 104.   Id. 
 105.   Id. (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384–85 (1992)); see also 
supra note 84 (listing subsequent decisions supporting the Bennett indication that § 1610(g) allows for 
the attachment of all Iranian property). 
 106.   Id. 
 107.   28 U.S.C. § 1610(f) (2012).  Section 1610(f) provides: 
(f)(1)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including but not limited to section 
208(f) of the Foreign Missions Act . . . and except as provided in subparagraph (B), any 
property with respect to which financial transactions are prohibited or regulated pursuant 
to section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act . . . section 620(a) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 . . . sections 202 and 203 of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act . . . or any other proclamation, order, regulation, or license issued pursuant 
thereto, shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution of any judgment 
relating to a claim for which a foreign state (including any agency or instrumentality or 
such state) claiming such property is not immune under section 1605(a)(7) (as in effect 
before the enactment of section 1605A [enacted Jan. 28, 2008]) or section 1605A. 
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majority further denied that their reading of § 1610(g) made references to 
the state terror exception § 1605A in § 1610(a)(7) and § 1610(b)(3) 
superfluous, relying on two Seventh Circuit cases: Gates v. Syrian Arab 
Republic and Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic.108  In Gates, the Seventh 
Circuit held that § 1610(g) “allow[ed] attachment of a much broader range 
of assets to satisfy [§ 1605A related] judgments” than § 1610(a) or (b).109  
In Wyatt, the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs proceeding under § 
1610(g) need not comply with the FSIA § 1608(e), which relates to 
attachment of foreign owned real estate in preferred mortgage 
foreclosures.110  The Ninth Circuit majority also relied on “Congress’ 
intention to make it easier for victims of terrorism to recover judgments,” 
evidenced by statements made by one of the sponsors of the 2008 NDAA 
bill, Senator Frank Lautenberg.111 
In his partial dissent, Judge Dee V. Benson agreed that TRIA 
permitted the attachment of the funds at issue, but disagreed that § 1610(g) 
was a freestanding immunity exception.112  Judge Benson concluded that 
in enacting § 1610(g), “Congress did not . . . intend to open the floodgates 
and allow terrorism plaintiffs to attach any and all Iranian property in the 
                                                            
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply if, at the time the property is expropriated or 
seized by the foreign state, the property has been held in title by a natural person or, 
if held in trust, has been held for the benefit of a natural person or persons. 
(2)(A) At the request of any party in whose favor a judgment has been issued with respect 
to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a)(7) (as in effect 
before the enactment of section 1605A [enacted Jan. 28, 2008]) or section 1605A, the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should make every effort to fully, 
promptly, and effectively assist any judgment creditor or any court that has issued any such 
judgment in identifying, locating, and executing against the property of that foreign state 
or any agency or instrumentality of such state. 
(B) In providing such assistance, the Secretaries— 
(i) may provide such information to the court under seal; and 
(ii) should make every effort to provide the information in a manner sufficient 
to allow the court to direct the United States Marshall’s office to promptly and 
effectively execute against that property. 
(3) Waiver. The President may waive any provision of paragraph (1) in the interest of 
national security. 
Id. 
 108.   Bennett, 825 F.3d at 959–62. 
 109.   Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 576 (7th Cir. 2014), overruled by Rubin v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 487 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 110.   Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 331, 343 (7th Cir. 2015), overruled by Rubin v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 487 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Bennett, 825 F.3d at 960–61. 
 111.   Bennett, 825 F.3d at 960–62 (citing 154 Cong. Rec. S54-01 (Jan. 22, 2008) (statement of 
Sen. Lautenberg) (indicating that the purpose of the bill, and § 1610(g) particularly, was to make it 
easier for terror victims to collect the judgment amounts owed to them)). 
 112.   Id. at 966–69 (Benson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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United States . . . [but] intended the commerce limitation [of § 1610(a)] to 
remain in place.”113  Judge Benson also recognized the role the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion might play in the Seventh Circuit’s disposition in Rubin 
a few months later.114  Judge Benson wrote “[s]urely this Court’s holding 
will be argued as precedent to allow the Rubin plaintiffs to seize Persian 
artifacts to be auctioned off to satisfy the Rubin plaintiffs’ default 
judgments . . . an unjustified and unfortunate result.”115 
2.  Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran 
a. Facts and Litigation History 
The plaintiffs in the Rubin cases have been in and out of litigation 
since filing their initial suit, Campunzo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, in 
2001.116  The initial suit was brought by or on behalf of eight U.S. citizens, 
including the Rubins, who were victims of Hamas suicide bombers in 
Jerusalem in September 1997.117  The district court found these plaintiffs 
were entitled to a total $71.5 million default judgment, which Iran 
subsequently refused to pay.118  Over the next thirteen years, plaintiffs 
from the Campunzo suit joined with the Rubins and attempted to satisfy 
their judgments by attaching Iranian assets, including collections of 
Persian antiquities in the possession of various American museums within 
the jurisdictions of the First and Seventh Circuits.119  The First Circuit held 
that antiquities originating from Iran and housed at the Boston Museum of 
Fine Arts and Harvard University could not be attached because they did 
                                                            
 113.   Id. at 969. 
 114.   Id. 
 115.   Id. 
 116.   See Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261 (D.D.C. 2003) 
(initiating action to secure damages from Iran for injuries sustained from a state-sponsored terror attack 
in which the Rubins were among the plaintiffs); see also Jennifer Anglim Kreder & Kimberly Degraaf, 
Museums in the Crosshairs: Unintended Consequences of the War on Terror, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 239, 243–47 (2011) (describing bombing incident that injured Jenny Rubin and others 
and summarizing the litigation that followed). 
 117.   See Campunzo, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 260; see also Kreder & Degraaf, supra note 116, at 243–
47 (describing the specific injuries incurred by the Campunzo and Rubin plaintiffs); see also Rubin v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 473–74 (7th Cir. 2016) (providing the background of litigation 
in the case), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017). 
 118.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 473. 
 119.   Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 810 F. Supp. 2d 402, 403 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d, 709 F. 
3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1005–06 (N.D. Ill. 
2014), aff’d, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Kreder & Degraaf, supra note 115, at 242, 251–
54 (providing overviews of the First and Seventh Circuit suits). 
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not qualify as property of Iran.120  The Seventh Circuit, however, found 
that one collection of assets held at the University of Chicago’s Oriental 
Institute, the Persepolis Collection, met the two threshold requirements for 
attachment under § 1610 of the FSIA.121 
The Persepolis Collection, also known as the Persepolis Fortification 
Archive (“the PFA”), arrived at the University of Chicago Oriental 
Institute in the mid-1930s, as a long-term loan from the Iranian 
Government for “study and analysis” at the Institute.122  Consisting of tens 
of thousands of clay tablets and fragments, the PFA contains 
administrative records of the Persepolis region in southwestern Iran from 
approximately 500 B.C.123  The records contain information about the 
“daily lives of ordinary people living in the Persian Empire” and were 
written primarily in the rarely studied Elamite language.124  Counsel for 
the Rubin plaintiffs, David Strachman, indicated that he sought to attach, 
and then sell, the PFA tablets to help execute the judgment owed to the 
Rubins after reading about the research done by the Oriental Institute and 
their interactions with Iran.125  However, others feared that selling the 
tablets and potentially breaking up the PFA collection would undermine 
their cultural significance.126  In addition to harming the collection itself, 
Gil J. Stein, Director of the Oriental Institute, specified that attaching the 
PFA tablets could strain the tenuous relationship between the United 
States and Iran further and “do irrevocable harm to scholarly cooperation 
and cultural exchanges throughout the world.”127  “Cultural heritage and 
                                                            
 120.   Rubin, 709 F.3d at 58. 
 121.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 473–74. 
 122.   Persepolis Fortification Archive, U. OF CHI., THE ORIENTAL INST., 
https://oi.uchicago.edu/research/projects/persepolis-fortification-archive (last visited Sept. 30, 2017); 
see also Claire R. Thomas, Note, “That Belongs in a Museum!” Rubin v. Iran: Implications for the 
Persian Collection of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 257, 261–66 (2009) (providing additional background information regarding the Persepolis 
Collection and its role in the Rubin litigation). 
 123.   Persepolis Fortification Archive, supra note 122. 
 124.   Thomas, supra note 122, at 264. 
 125.   Alicia M. Hilton, Terror Victims at the Museum Gates: Testing the Commercial Activity 
Exception Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 53 VILL. L. REV. 479, 494–95 (2008).  
“Whether [the tablets] fetch, you know, $100 or $100,000 or $100 million, whatever funds are raised 
should be [used] to compensate the victims,” Strachman told NPR in 2006.  Cheryl Corley, Fight Over 
Ancient Persian Tablets Goes to U.S. Court, NPR (July 17, 2006, 6:00 AM) [hereinafter Fight], 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5562022. 
 126.   Professor Matthew Stolper’s, of the Oriental Institute, comments suggest that “the true 
significance of the tablets lies in the story they tell as a comprehensive unit,” not in their individual 
capacities.  Thomas, supra note 122, at 265–66 (citing comments from Matthew Stolpher’s interview 
with NPR in Fight, supra note 125). 
 127.   Gil J. Stein, A Heritage Threatened: The Persepolis Tablets Lawsuit and the Oriental 
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scholarship,” Stein wrote passionately in 2007, “must transcend 
politics.”128 
The Rubin plaintiffs sought “to attach and execute on Iranian assets in 
order to satisfy the[ir] judgment” for over ten years.129  Despite a number 
of procedural issues,130 their most recent attempt to seize the PFA tablets 
began in the Eastern Division of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois. 131  The Rubins and Iran differed on three 
primary points.  First, the parties disagreed about whether the Oriental 
Institute was Iran’s “agent” within the meaning of the statute and whether 
“studying and displaying the artifacts constitute[d] ‘commercial activity’” 
and thus made them attachable under § 1610(a).132  Second, the parties 
argued over the applicability of TRIA to certain collections at issue, which 
would render arguments about the use of § 1610(g) unnecessary.133  
Finally, the parties diverged over whether § 1610(g) was a freestanding 
exception to state sovereign immunity under the FSIA, allowing 
“execution against all terror states’ assets” regardless of whether or not the 
assets also met the requirements of § 1610(a) or (b).134  The court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the several defendants, including the 
University of Chicago and the Oriental Institute.135  The court held “there 
[was] no evidence that the Institute may properly be considered an agent 
of Iran,” denying attachment under § 1610(a).136  The court also held the 
PFA tablets were not frozen or blocked assets, making TRIA 
inapplicable.137  Finally, the court held § 1610(g) was not a freestanding 
immunity exception because the plaintiffs provided “virtually no support 
for their contention that Section 1610(g) expands the bases for attachment” 
                                                            
Institute, ORIENTAL INST. NEWS & NOTES, Winter 2007, at 3, 5, 
https://oi.uchicago.edu/sites/oi.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/shared/docs/nn192.pdf. 
 128.   Id. 
 129.   Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part, 
137 S.Ct. 2326 (2017). 
 130.   For detailed litigation history of procedural issues faced by the Rubins, see id. at 473; Rubin 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 810 F. Supp. 2d 402, 405–06 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d, 709 F. 3d 49 (1st Cir. 
2013) (rejecting an effort to attach Iranian antiquities in the possession of various museums); Rubin 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff’d, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 
2016), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017) (same). 
 131.   Rubin, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1003. 
 132.   Id. at 1009. 
 133.   Id. at 1014. 
 134.   Id. at 1012. 
 135.   Id. at 1017. 
 136.   Id. at 1011. 
 137.   Id. at 1014–16. 
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and further, the plain language of the subsection did not support their 
assertion.138  The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit.139 
b.  The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis and Ruling 
A three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the ruling of the district court, holding neither § 1610(a) nor TRIA 
supported the attachment of the PFA tablets, and that § 1610(g) was not a 
freestanding exception to foreign sovereign immunity.140  First, drawing 
on support from the United States’ amicus curiae brief in support of the 
appellees, and decisions of the Fifth, Second, and Ninth Circuits, the panel 
held that under § 1610(a), regardless of whether or not “academic study 
qualifies as a commercial use[,] . . . a foreign state may lose its execution 
immunity only by its own commercial use of its property in the United 
States.”141  In this case, the University of Chicago was using the property, 
not Iran.142  Second, the panel held that TRIA did not apply because the 
PFA collection was “unblocked” property after President Carter’s 
executive orders implementing the Algier Accords, and therefore, owned 
solely by Iran.143  Finally, the panel held that § 1610(g) was not a 
freestanding exception to immunity, directly opposing the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Bennett.144 
The Seventh Circuit panel first compared the language of § 1610(g) to 
the factors derived from Bancec, coming to the same conclusion as the 
Ninth Circuit in Bennett and providing a chart comparing the language of 
                                                            
 138.   Id. at 1013. 
 139.   Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 473–74 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in 
part, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017). 
 140.   Id. at 48687. 
 141.   Id. at 479–80; see also Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 
13, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-1935) (“By its plain text, 
Section 1610(g) makes clear that it applies only where property is otherwise attachable ‘as provided 
in this section.’  Section 1610 elsewhere requires that a foreign state’s attachable property have been 
‘used for a commercial activity in the United States,’ and Section 1610(g) carries forward this 
requirement.”) (citation omitted); Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 
120, 131 (2d Cir. 2009) (establishing that funds had to be used for commercial activity by the state or 
a state entity prior to attachment); Af-Cap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 
1090–91 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting the Fifth Circuit’s commercial activity test); Conn. Bank of 
Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 256 n.5 (5th Cir. 2002) (establishing that “what 
matters under the statute is how the foreign state uses the property, not how private parties may have 
used the property in the past”). 
 142.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 473. 
 143.   Id. 
 144.   Id. at 482. 
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a typical iteration of the factors from case law and § 1610(g).145  The court 
concluded “subsection (g) permits a terror victim who wins a § 1605A 
judgment to execute on the property of the foreign state and the property 
of its agency or instrumentality ‘as provided in this section’ but 
‘regardless of’ the five factors.”146  In addition to holding § 
1610(g)(1)(A)–(E) were incorporated to remove the Bancec factors, the 
court also held that the language “as provided in this section” in § 1610(g) 
referred to the entirety of § 1610, not just § 1610(f) as the Bennett panel 
concluded.147  The Seventh Circuit panel found that “as provided in this 
section” would be an unnecessary inclusion if § 1610(g) was a 
freestanding exception to execution immunity and thus the Bennett panel’s 
reading would violate the “‘cardinal principle’ that a statute should be 
interpreted to avoid superfluity.”148  Additionally, according to the panel, 
discussions of the Flatow Amendment (or § 1605A) would be unnecessary 
in § 1610(a)(7) and § 1610(b)(3) if “subsection (g) pave[d] a dedicated 
lane for all execution actions by victims of state-sponsored terrorism.”149  
In other words, if § 1610(g) was specifically intended to address all terror 
victims attempts to attach the property of state terror sponsors, the panel 
felt Congress would not have included references to § 1605A in other 
subsections. 
                                                            
 145.   Id. at 483. The court included the following chart: 
Bancec Doctrine Factors Factors Made Irrelevant by Subsection (g) 
(1) the level of economic control by the 
government; 
(A) the level of economic control over the 
property by the government of the foreign 
state; 
(2) whether the entity’s profits go to the 
government; 
(B) whether the profits of the property go to 
that government; 
(3) the degree to which government 
officials manage the entity or otherwise 
have a hand in its daily affairs; 
(C) the degree to which officials of that 
government manage the property or 
otherwise control its daily affairs; 
(4) whether the government is the real 
beneficiary of the entity’s conduct; and 
(D) whether that government is the sole 
beneficiary in interest of the property; or 
(5) whether adherence to separate identities 
would entitle the foreign state to benefits in 
United States courts while avoiding its 
obligations. 
(E) whether establishing the property as a 
separate entity would entitle the foreign state 
to benefits in United States courts while 
avoiding its obligations. 
Id. 
 146.   Id. at 482. 
 147.   Id. 
 148.   Id. at 484 (citing TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)). 
 149.   Id. 
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Finally, the Rubin panel directly rebutted the Bennett majority’s 
interpretation, stating that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that § 1610(g) 
only applied to the preceding subsection, § 1610(f), pertaining to assets 
blocked by federal regulations was “highly strained.”150  While § 
1610(f)(1)(A) denies immunity from attachment to financial assets of state 
terror sponsors “blocked” by the United States under other provisions, § 
1610(f)(3) allows the President to “waive any provision of paragraph (1)” 
of § 1610(f) “in the interest of national security.”151  Various Presidents 
have upheld a waiver of § 1610(f)(1) almost since its inclusion and this 
waiver has not been redacted or overridden and was in place when § 
1610(g) was enacted.152  Thus § 1610(f) has never been applied in any suit 
during § 1610(g)’s existence.  The Seventh Circuit panel argued that 
because § 1610(f) “never became operative,” § 1610(g) would “[make] no 
sense” if the phrase “in this section” only referred to § 1610(f).153 
The Rubin panel further found the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Gates 
and Wyatt was misplaced, as both cases left “the fundamental interpretive 
question about the scope of § 1610(g) . . . unexamined” and thus overruled 
the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in these cases “to the extent that [the cases 
could] be read as holding that § 1610(g) is a freestanding exception to 
execution immunity for terrorism-related judgments.”154 
Judge David Hamilton dissented, raising two primary concerns about 
the majority’s decision.  The first was a unique procedural issue outside 
the scope of this Comment.155  Judge Hamilton’s primary argument in 
disagreement with the Rubin majority, however, was that the Ninth 
Circuit’s reading of § 1610(g) fits better with the legislative intent of the 
subsection.156  Judge Hamilton wrote: 
                                                            
 150.   Id. at 486. 
 151.   Id.; 28 U.S.C. 1610(f)(3) (2012).  President Clinton issued a “blanket waiver” pursuant to 
the subsection almost as soon as it was adopted.  Rubin, 830 F.3d at 486–87 (citing Presidential 
Determination No. 99-1, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,201 (Oct. 21, 1998)).  While Congress “briefly repealed the 
President’s waiver authority,” the authority was quickly restored and the President re-waived § 
1610(f)(1)’s provisions on October 28, 2000.  Id. at 487; see also Presidential Determination No. 2001-
03, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,483 (Oct. 28, 2000) (waiving § 1610(f)(1) “in the interest of national security”). 
 152.   See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 486; see also Presidential Determination No. 2001-03, 65 Fed. Reg. 
66,483. 
 153.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 486–87 (describing how § 1610(f) never became operative). 
 154.   Id. at 485–87. 
 155.   In the Seventh Circuit, procedural rules dictate that when a panel creates a circuit split or 
overrules precedent, the opinion must automatically circulate within the entire court to determine “if 
a majority of active judges wish to rehear the case en banc.” Id. at 489 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); see 
also supra note 15. 
 156.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 489–90 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
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Both [the Bennett and Rubin courts’] readings of the text, I believe, are 
reasonable, meaning that the text is ambiguous.  The courts must choose 
between two statutory readings: one that favors state sponsors of 
terrorism, and another that favors victims of that terrorism . . . .  [I]n 
interpreting an ambiguous statutory text, we can and should draw on 
statutory purpose and legislative history . . . .  The balance here should 
weigh in favor of the reading that favors the victims.157 
III. ANALYSIS OF § 1610(G) CONSTRUCTION, INTENT, AND 
INTERPRETATION 
The Rubin panel’s interpretation of § 1610(g) of the FSIA is correct 
for four primary reasons.  First, the language and construction of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1610 and subsection (g) support the Rubin panel’s analysis.  Second, the 
Rubin opinion and Bennett dissent conform to Congress’s intent in 
enacting § 1610(g) in the 2008 NDAA.  Third, the Rubin panel’s partial 
overruling of Gates and Wyatt was appropriate because neither case 
sincerely examined § 1610(g).  Finally, the Rubin reading of § 1610(g) 
supports public policy concerns, including the maintenance of 
international diplomatic relationships and the protection of invaluable 
cultural antiquities. 
A. Language and Construction 
The language and construction of § 1610(g) support the Rubin court’s 
interpretation based on several different canons of construction.  First, the 
traditional “plain meaning rule” dictates “the meaning of a statute must, in 
the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and 
if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according 
to its terms.”158  There is “no safer nor better settled canon of 
interpretation” than the “plain meaning rule.”159  Second, “expressio 
unius” is the “common sense language rule that the expression of one thing 
suggests the exclusion of another thing,” or that intentional inclusion 
indicates intentional omission as well.160  Third, to determine the meaning 
of a statute, courts must also look to the context of particular provisions 
                                                            
 157.   Id. at 489–90 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
 158.   2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (Norman Singer & Shambie Singer, 
eds., 7th ed. 2016) [hereinafter SUTHERLAND] (citing Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). 
 159.   Id. (citing Swarts v. Siegel, 117 F. 13, 13 (8th Cir. 1902)). 
 160.   Jacob Scott, Comment, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 341, 351 (2010). 
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within a section, statute, or act.161  Provisos, or specific conditions which 
must be met to appropriately apply a particular statute, often require 
analysis of context to determine under what circumstances they must be 
applied.162  Although “traditionally, a proviso restricted only the section of 
the act to which it was attached, or the sections which preceded it,” modern 
courts apply “a proviso to the entire act or a single section, depending on 
the legislature’s intention or a meaning otherwise indicated.”163 
As the court discussed in Rubin, and as I argue in this Comment, the 
plain language of the subsection at issue only suggests the removal of 
Bancec considerations when claims pertain to the state-sponsored terror 
exception to foreign sovereign immunity, § 1605A.164  No language in § 
1610(g) suggests the subsection is a freestanding immunity exception for 
attaching any property belonging to a state sponsor of terrorism, or its 
instrumentalities in the United States.  Additionally, the phrase “as 
provided in this section” should be read broadly in reference to the entirety 
of § 1610 under the principal rules of statutory construction regarding 
“expressio unius” and provisos, and not narrowly as a reference only to § 
1610(f).  Applying § 1610(g) exclusively to § 1610(f), or considering § 
1610(g) a freestanding immunity exception, would refer to § 1605A claims 
in § 1610(a) and (b), as well as other sections of the statute and provisions 
of law, inappropriately superfluous. 
1. Disregarding the Bancec Factors 
A literal reading of § 1610(g) suggests that the five factors of the 
subsection are a reference to the Bancec test.  Both the Bennett and Rubin 
courts agree with this sentiment, but disagree about whether or not this is 
the only possible consequence of § 1610(g).165  The Bancec doctrine is 
often applied when determining if immunity should be granted to separate 
juridical entities, regardless of whether immunity is denied for the 
sovereign to which they are an entity.166  Nodding to the usual application 
of the Bancec factors, § 1610(g) expressly refers to “separate juridical 
                                                            
 161.   See generally 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 158, § 47:2. 
 162.   See generally id. § 47:9. 
 163.   Id. 
 164.   Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 484 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part, 
137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017). 
 165.   Id. at 482–83; Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 166.   See Bennett, 825 F.3d at 955–56. 
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entit[ies].”167  The language of § 1610(g)(1)(A)–(E) also closely mirrors 
the Bancec factors as construed in Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. 
Republic of Philippines, and applies “regardless of” those factors.168  Both 
the Rubin and Bennett panels agree that § 1610(g) suggests ignoring the 
potential application of the Bancec factors to state sponsors of terror and 
their separate juridical entities, and thus denying terror sponsors immunity 
in all circumstances.169 
According to the common language rule, espressio unius, expressly 
including only the Bancec factors as considerations that courts should 
disregard when applying § 1610(g) indicates that these factors were the 
only potential concerns Congress wanted the courts to set aside when 
considering immunity from attachment for entities of state terror sponsors.  
If Congress intended § 1610(g) as a freestanding immunity exception, 
Congress was not limited to listing only the Bancec factors as 
considerations to disregard.  Congress could have included additional 
subsections pursuant to § 1610(g)(1), asking courts to also disregard the 
“commercial use” requirements of § 1610(a) and (b), or the rest of § 1610, 
when allowing plaintiffs to attach the assets of state terror sponsors or their 
separate juridical entities, but it did not. 
Alternatively, Congress could also have included the proviso 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law” in § 1610(g), as they did in 
TRIA § 201(a) and in § 1610(f).  While Congress would still need to 
expressly include a list of Bancec factors because they are based on case 
law and not statutory provisions, including the language “notwithstanding 
any other provision of law” would make the Ninth Circuit panel’s 
conclusion more appropriate.  The omission of this phrase, or a similar 
phrase, indicates that the requirements of § 1610(a) and (b), as well as the 
rest of § 1610, still apply to claims pursuant to § 1610(g), even if the 
Bancec factors do not. 
2. “In This Section,” Superfluity, and Word Choice 
Unlike the Ninth and Seventh Circuits’ agreement over the easing of 
the Bancec factors under § 1610(g), the panels strongly disagreed about 
Congress’s intended meaning of “in this section.”  While both majorities 
provide compelling rationales for their opinions, the Rubin majority 
                                                            
 167.   28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1) (2012); see also supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text 
discussing “separate juridical entities.” 
 168.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 482–83.  See also supra note 145. 
 169.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 482–83; Bennett, 825 F.3d at 955–56. 
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opinion and Bennett dissent offer the more fundamentally persuasive 
argument—that “in this section” refers to the entirety of § 1610, not just § 
1610(f).  Both rely on the same “cardinal principle” of statutory 
construction—that a statute should be read to avoid making any “clause, 
sentence, or word” superfluous or unnecessary.170 
If § 1610(g) is construed only as a reference to the subsection 
preceding it as the Bennett majority suggests, Congress’s inclusion of 
references to § 1605A in other sections would be unnecessary.171  Section 
1610(a)(7) denies immunity from attachment to property of foreign states 
used for commercial activity in the United States if “the judgment relates 
to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605A 
or section 1605(a)(7) . . . .”172  Section 1610(b)(3) provides the same basic 
rule for agencies or instrumentalities denied immunity under § 1605A.173  
If, as the Bennett court suggests, § 1610(g) is a freestanding exception to 
immunity, § 1610(g) would automatically govern all property that 
plaintiffs sought to attach pursuant to § 1605A, regardless of its 
“commercial use,” and additional references to § 1605A in other sections 
of § 1610, including references in § 1610(a) and (b), would be 
unnecessary. 
Furthermore, intepreting § 1610(g)’s “as provided in this section” 
language is a reference back to § 1610(f) is illogical, primarily because § 
1610(f) was not operative at the time of § 1610(g)’s adoption, and has 
never been operative since.174  Congress passed § 1610(g) only eight years 
after President Clinton waived § 1610(f) for the second time.175  It is 
unlikely that Congress would pass an amendment dependent on subsection 
§ 1610(f) which would be “effectively a nullity upon passage” because 
“Congress is presumed to legislate against the backdrop of the ‘known 
state of laws.’”176  Because § 1610(f) has never been operative, reading § 
1610(g)’s grant of immunity “exception ‘as provided in [§ 1610(f)]’ would 
mean no execution at all.”177  Additionally, if § 1610(g) is to be considered 
a freestanding immunity exception, it is unlikely that it would need to refer 
                                                            
 170.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 484 (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 524 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)); Bennett, 825 
F.3d at 968 (Benson, J., dissenting) (citing TRW, 524 U.S at 31). 
 171.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 484–87. 
 172.   28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7) (2012). 
 173.   Id. § 1610(b)(3). 
 174.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 486–87. 
 175.   Id.; see also supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text. 
 176.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487 (citing Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2280 (2016)). 
 177.   Id. 
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back to a subsection that is in place, “notwithstanding any other provision 
of law,” when neither subsection mentions the other expressly.  To contend 
that a freestanding § 1610(g) refers to § 1610(f) would be saying that one 
independent immunity exception is in fact dependent on another to 
function.  This cannot be the case. 
Finally, Congress’s word choice and lack of specificity in the phrase, 
“as provided in this section,” is telling.  The plain meaning of the word 
“section” implies a broader set of inclusions than the terms: “subsection;” 
“paragraph;” or “subparagraph,” used in other portions of § 1610 and § 
1610(g).178  Additionally, many of the references within § 1610 to another 
“section” expressly refer to whole segments of law with the same level of 
specificity as the entirety of § 1610.179  “Section,” as used in § 1610(g)’s 
phrase “as provided in this section,” is more likely a reference to § 1610 
as a whole, rather than another unspecified subsection of § 1610.  Instead 
of adopting the Bennett court’s interpretation, courts should read “in this 
section” as referring to the entirety of § 1610 as the Rubin panel did and 
the United States as amicus suggested in both Rubin and Bennett. 
In effect, the Rubin reading would require attachments under § 
1610(g) to also have a “commercial use” under § 1610(a) or (b), or to 
comply with another subsection of § 1610 before § 1610(g) privileges 
could apply.  Essentially, only when (1) the property at issue belongs to a 
foreign state, sued pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism exception, § 
1605A; and (2) the same property is subject to attachment “as provided” 
under subsections § 1610(a)–(f), would § 1610(g) be applicable to 
alleviate the Bancec factor analysis.  This would be the appropriate 
application of the “cardinal principles of statutory construction” and 
alleviate the issues of reading superfluity and unintended consequences 
into § 1610(g). 
B. The Intent of § 1610(g) 
Both the Rubin and Bennett panels agreed that Congress included § 
1610(g) in the 2008 NDAA as a response to the ongoing struggles terror 
victims had in attempting to execute their court ordered judgments against 
Iran.180  While there is no doubt Congress sought to make this process 
                                                            
 178.   See § 1610(b) (“In addition to subsection (a) . . . .”). 
 179.   See id. at § 1610(a)(7). 
 180.   See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 481 (“The other major change was the creation of § 1610(g), which 
applies to execution proceedings to enforce judgments obtained under § 1605A and eases the 
collection process for victims of state-sponsored terrorism.”); Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 
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easier for sympathetic plaintiffs, the courts disagreed about how much 
Congress intended to abrogate the preexisting requirements for 
attachment.181  While the Rubin court’s reading of § 1610(g) suggests a 
less extreme step toward easing attachment requirements for terror 
victims, this reading is substantially more prudent than the Bennett panel’s 
interpretation, particularly in light of the assets at issue in Rubin. 
Under the Bennett court’s interpretation of § 1610(g), “any and all 
Iranian property in the United States” could be attached to aid in execution 
of a terror victim’s judgment.182  The courts have already limited 
attachment under § 1610(g) by holding that a “plain reading of § 1610(g) 
offers no indication that Congress intended to eliminate the immunity that 
has long been afforded to diplomatic properties . . . .”183  Therefore, § 
1610(g) cannot allow for the attachment of all Iranian property because 
particular property maintains immunity for diplomatic purposes.184  While 
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation would provide more attachable assets for 
terror victim plaintiffs to apply toward their judgments, this reading goes 
against case precedent that limits the kinds of assets that can be seized.185 
The Rubin court’s reading of § 1610(g), by contrast, benefits plaintiffs 
by simply removing the presumed Bancec factor considerations generally 
required to attach separate juridical entities of a foreign sovereign in aid 
of execution.186  Allowing for the attachment of separate juridical entities, 
like Bank Melli, without requiring that the entity meets one of the Bancec 
exceptions opens up potential attachment options not permissible prior to 
the 2008 NDAA.187  That the United States, through amicus briefs filed in 
both Bennett and Rubin, agrees with the Rubin panel is also a strong 
indication the majority in Rubin has correctly interpreted Congress’s intent 
to simply remove the generally required application of Bancec under 
§1610(g).188 
                                                            
F.3d 949, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2016)  (“Congress responded by enacting new statutes, this time designed 
to facilitate the satisfaction of such judgments by expanding successful plaintiffs’ ability to attach and 
execute on the property of agencies and instrumentalities of terrorist states.”). 
 181.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 486; Bennett, 825 F.3d at, 960. 
 182.   825 F.3d at 969 (Benson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 183.   In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 102 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 184.   Bennett, 825 F.3d at 969 (Benson, J., dissenting). 
 185.   Id. 
 186.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487. 
 187.   See also Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (approving attachment of 
Bank Markazi, a separate juridical entity of Iran under 22 U.S.C. § 8772). 
 188.   Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 25–26, Rubin v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-1935); Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 9–10, Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949 
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Certain members of Congress have started taking steps to clarify § 
1610(g) to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to attach cultural antiquities, 
particularly in the future, suggesting that courts permitting attachment of 
cultural antiquities was unanticipated or undesired.189  The Foreign 
Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act, enacted in 
December 2016, created a new subsection (h) to 28 U.S.C. § 1605.190  This 
subsection, entitled “Jurisdictional immunity for certain art exhibition 
activities,” dictates that interactions between the United States and foreign 
entities to facilitate display or temporary exhibition of foreign works that 
meet the requirements of the Immunity From Seizure Act (“IFSA”) do not 
constitute “commercial use” within the sense of FSIA, or open foreign 
entities up to suit in the United States.191  The committee report on the 
version of the Act’s initial proposal that originated in the House explains 
that “[f]oreign governments are discouraged from such lending by the 
possibility that it will open them up to litigation in U.S. courts for which 
they would otherwise be immune.  This legislation fixes this problem by 
making a narrowly tailored change to FSIA.”192  While the Act fails to 
specifically address the issue of potential immunity under § 1610, by 
clarifying the “commercial use” question, the Act suggests that § 1610(a), 
the “commercial activity” requirement for attachment, would likely apply 
to § 1610(g).193  Although the Seventh Circuit’s understanding of § 
1610(g) provides fewer options for plaintiffs than the Bennett panel might 
have hoped, it still partially fulfills Congress’s goal of making it easier to 
compensate terror victims without going beyond the reasonable bounds 
Congress likely intended. 
C.  The Propriety of Overruling Precedent 
The Seventh Circuit also appropriately overruled portions of their 
previous decisions in Gates and Wyatt.  As the court pointed out, neither 
Gates nor Wyatt thoroughly considered the meaning of § 1610(g).194  
Instead, the courts in Gates and Wyatt left the subsection as an 
                                                            
(9th Cir. 2016) (Nos. 13-15442, 13-16100). 
 189.   Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 114-319, 
130 Stat. 1618 (2016) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(h)). 
 190.   § 2, 130 Stat. at 1618. 
 191.   Id.; see supra notes 33–34. 
 192.   H.R. REP. NO. 114-141, at 2 (2015). 
 193.   § 2, 130 Stat. at 1618. 
 194.   Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 486 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part, 
137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017). 
2017 INDIANA JONES AND FSIA 213 
“unexamined premise.”195  Neither case required a deep analysis of § 
1610(g) because other provisions of the FSIA provided for attachment of 
the assets of foreign state sponsors of terror sought by the plaintiffs in 
those cases.196  By overruling Gates and Wyatt to the extent that they could 
be understood as “holding that § 1610(g) [was] a freestanding exception 
to execution immunity for terrorism-related judgments,” the panel 
correctly maintained the primary holdings of the cases and attempted to 
prevent future misunderstanding of § 1610(g).197  While even partially 
overruling Seventh Circuit precedent may be procedurally problematic in 
this case, the panel acted appropriately here because the primary holdings 
and judgments in both cases remain.198 
D.  Public Policy Concerns 
In cases like Rubin and Bennett courts often find themselves in 
scenarios similar to those Dr. Jones faces throughout the Indiana Jones 
movies—forced to choose between a pit filled with poisonous snakes and 
a room full of creepy-crawly beetles.  On one hand, the courts aim to 
support terror victims by helping provide justice and compensation for 
their suffering; on the other hand, courts are forced to consider the 
educational, political, and diplomatic ramifications of denying foreign 
state-sponsors of terror immunity, seizing their assets, or sometimes, 
allowing their cultural treasures to be sold off to the highest bidder who 
may not fully appreciate their worth.  The FSIA seeks to ameliorate some 
of the “case-by-case diplomatic pressures” associated with cases like 
Rubin and Bennett, but simply cannot remove them all.199  In these kinds 
of cases it is essential for courts to consider issues of public policy.  Here, 
the Seventh Circuit appropriately read § 1610(g) to protect the PFA tablets 
and allow them to remain where they can generate the most value to 
society.200 
When comparing the decisions of Bennett and Rubin, it is important 
to first compare the kinds of assets each set of plaintiffs attempted to attach 
                                                            
 195.   Id. 
 196.   See Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 580–81 (7th Cir. 2014), overruled by 
Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487; Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 311, 311 (7th Cir. 2015), overruled 
by Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487. 
 197.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487. 
 198.   See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 199.   Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983) (providing an overview 
of FSIA’s purposes). 
 200.   Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487. 
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to satisfy their judgment.  In Bennett, the plaintiffs sought financial assets, 
a standard form of compensatory or punitive damages in civil suits.201  
Money is commonplace and not imbued with any sentimental, academic, 
or cultural value.  Unlike the antiquities sought by the plaintiffs in Rubin, 
financial assets are not something that can be entirely lost or destroyed and 
never replaced.  In fact, due to the nature of financial assets sought in 
Bennett, the Ninth Circuit was not required to consider § 1610(g) at all.  
The financial remedy the Bennett plaintiffs sought was reachable under 
the TRIA § 201(a), “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”202  
Because there was no question the TRIA allowed for the attachment of 
Iranian assets blocked or frozen by the U.S. government, which included 
the Visa and Franklin funds, the Ninth Circuit did not need to look 
elsewhere or redefine other areas of the law, like § 1610(g), to reach the 
plaintiffs’ objective.203 
Unlike money, antiquities, and in particular the PFA tablets sought by 
the Rubin plaintiffs, are unique and irreplaceable.  Not only do the PFA 
tablets include some of the oldest writings in the world, but they are also 
held by the institution that can most likely best utilize them.204  The 
University of Chicago’s Oriental Institute is one of the few academic 
institutions in the world with so many scholars versed in Persian history 
and able to read the nearly dead Elamite language.205  Additionally, unlike 
most financial assets, it is entirely impossible to replace historical artifacts 
like those in the PFA collection, important to Iranian citizens and global 
scholars alike.  If the Rubin plaintiffs were to be awarded the PFA tablets, 
they would likely sell them, perhaps to buyers who would not, or could 
not, provide the same level of care as the University of Chicago.206  In 
addition, according to scholars, the collection is best viewed as a whole 
rather than in fragments.207  Selling off parts of the collection could destroy 
the historical integrity and academic value of the collection, undoing the 
eighty years of scholarly inquiry pursued by the Oriental Institute, and 
                                                            
 201.   Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 202.   Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107297, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 2322, 2337 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.). 
 203.   Bennett, 825 F.3d at 96970 (Benson, J. concurring). 
 204.   Stein, supra note 127, at 3. 
 205.   Id. (“This extremely di cult language can be read by only a tiny number of highly- trained 
researchers, perhaps no more than twenty or so throughout the world.”) 
 206.   See Fight, supra note 125; Thomas, supra note 122, at 286–88 (discussing the implications 
of attaching the tablets to the Rubin judgment in section “VIII. Implications of the Lawsuit”). 
 207.   Fight, supra note 125. 
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causing the collection to, both metaphorically and perhaps physically, 
crumble.208 
Historically, the United States has both aimed to maintain diplomacy 
and sometimes repair broken diplomatic relationships with other nations 
through the preservation of antiquities.  One simple step toward 
maintaining these goals would be to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s 
understanding of the FSIA § 1610(g), which is also supported by the 
United States.209  The ramifications of allowing plaintiffs to seize “national 
treasures” like the PFA tablets would be severe and counterproductive in 
repairing connections with Iran, and maintaining relationships with 
nations around the globe.  Today, the United States, through the IFSA, 
seeks to protect artifacts on loan from foreign nations, like the PFA tablets, 
from judicial proceedings in the United States.210  Unfortunately, because 
IFSA was enacted long after Iran loaned the PFA collection to the United 
States in 1936, there is no current legislation protecting the tablets.211  The 
courts, however, can protect the PFA tablets through the appropriate, 
limited interpretation of § 1610(g).  If the United States allowed 
attachment of the PFA tablets to satisfy the Rubins’ judgment, it would 
likely set a negative example internationally.  Seeing the United States 
attach antiquities could make other nations less likely to loan their artifacts 
to the United States in the future, a devastating blow to international 
cultural understanding and its global diplomacy.212  Additionally, U.S. 
museums and institutions fear that U.S. courts seizing foreign antiquities 
may open the United States up to reciprocal treatment.213 
                                                            
 208.   See id.; Thomas, supra note 122, at 286–88 (discussing the implications of attaching the 
tablets to the Rubin judgment in section “VIII. Implications of the Lawsuit”). 
 209.   See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016); Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 10, Rubin, 830 F.3d 470 (2016) (No. 14-1935); Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 10, Bennett v. Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 825 F.3d 949 (2016) (Nos. 13-15442, 13-16100). 
 210.   22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2012). 
 211.   See supra notes 33–34.  IFSA does not apply to the PFA tablets because for IFSA protection 
to apply, the “President or his designee” must find an object is “of cultural importance,” the activity 
within the U.S. is “in the national interest,” and must publish a notice indicating the findings in the 
Federal Register prior to importing the object.  § 2459.  Because the tablets were loaned to the United 
States in the 1930s, before IFSA was in place, the tablets could not have received a presidential 
designation prior to import. 
 212.   See Thomas, supra note 122, at 286–88 (discussing the possible effects of attaching the 
tablets to the Rubin judgment in section “VIII. Implications of the Lawsuit”); Lopez, supra note 30. 
 213.   Lopez, supra note 30 (“It is not surprising that foreign sovereigns, the U.S. Government, 
and U.S. museums are extremely concerned about these lawsuits [like Rubin].  Foreign sovereigns are, 
quite obviously, concerned because they do not want their national treasures confiscated.  The U.S. 
Government meanwhile fears reciprocal treatment of U.S. national treasures abroad.  For their part, 
U.S. museums are concerned for two reasons: (a) they worry that foreign nations will stop loaning 
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While the United States has long been at political odds with Iran, in 
part due to the nation’s support of terror attacks on U.S. citizens, taking 
away objects of cultural significance would punish not only Iran, but the 
likely innocent scholars, nationally and internationally, who might seek to 
study the PFA tablets.214  Consider § 1610(g)(3), which aims to protect 
against “the impairment of an interest held by a person who is not liable 
in the action giving rise to a judgment in property subject to attachment in 
aid of execution.”215  While § 1610(g)(3) does not apply to Rubin because 
the Oriental Institute holds no valid property right to the tablets, only a 
temporary right to possession while the tablets are on loan, the Oriental 
Institute does maintain a strong interest in the preservation and protection 
of the collection for academic purposes. 
Though the potential seizure of the PFA tablets arose under a very 
specific set of circumstances, the likelihood of similar circumstances 
arising in the future may continue to grow in light of the Justice Against 
State Sponsors of Terror Act.216  The Act particularly denies immunity 
“from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in any case in 
which money damages are sought” to countries supporting specified terror 
acts against the U.S.217  Although the Saudi Arabian assets available in the 
United States are likely less scarce and intrinsically different from those 
of Iran, it is almost certain that battles over Saudi Arabian valuable 
antiquities, like the Iranian PFA tablets, could arise in the near future if 
Saudi Arabia, like Iran, refuses to pay judgments held against them.218  
Adopting the Rubin court’s view would protect only a very narrow kind of 
property, only that which is not commercially used, while permitting 
plaintiffs to bypass the Bancec doctrine to reach assets of separate juridical 
entities of state sponsors of terror. 
                                                            
valuable collections to U.S. institutions, and (b) they worry about their own legal exposure, should a 
loan temporarily in their possession for exhibit or scholarship become entangled in an FSIA lawsuit.”). 
 214.   See Stein, supra note 126, at 5 (arguing for the protection of the PFA tablets as a piece of 
the “shared heritage of all people”). 
 215.   28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(3) (2012); see also supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 216.   See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 217.   Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016) (to 
be codified, in part, at 28 U.S.C. § 1605B). 
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IV.  RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND MOVING FORWARD 
Moving forward, the Rubin interpretation of § 1610(g) could be 
nationally applied in two ways.  First, the Legislature could act to amend 
the language in segments of the FSIA to clarify § 1610(g)’s intended 
purpose.  Alternatively, the Supreme Court could adopt the Seventh 
Circuit’s interpretation.  Parties in both cases have filed petitions for writs 
of certiorari.219  The Rubin petition, filed by the plaintiffs, asked the Court 
to clarify § 1610(g) and § 1610(a), while the Bennett petition, filed by the 
defendant Bank Melli, only sought clarification of § 1610(g).220  In June 
2017, the Court granted certiorari to address only the meaning of § 
1610(g).221  The Court will likely wait to take further action in Bennett 
until Rubin has been decided on the merits.222 
V. CONCLUSION 
After years of struggling his way through trains of wild animals, 
surviving dramatic fights with thieves and miscreants, and narrowly 
avoiding certain death by escaping a sinking, later exploding, ship Indiana 
Jones eventually placed Coronado’s crucifix into the hands of a museum 
curator.223  While Jones’s plight makes for great cinema, we should not 
require foreign sovereigns or American museums seeking to preserve 
historical artifacts to jump through judicial hoops to retain their cultural 
treasures against court orders.  The Rubin panel’s reading of § 1610(g), 
limiting § 1610(g) to merely removing the Bancec requirements usually 
applied to separate juridical entities and not serving as a “free-standing 
immunity exception,” should be nationally implemented in order to 
prevent the seizure of cultural antiquities in the future.  Based on the 
language and structure, Congressional intent, the propriety of overruling 
Seventh Circuit precedent, and the policy concerns associated with § 
1610(g), the Rubin reading is a more appropriate balance between 
providing foreign sovereign immunity and compensating terror victims for 
their suffering. 
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Congress could remedy the confusion by passing additional legislation 
to clarify its intent in enacting § 1610(g).  In the meantime, the Supreme 
Court should read § 1610(g) as eliminating the Bancec factors for the 
attachment of assets to compensate terror victims, but not as a freestanding 
immunity exception allowing for the seizure of any asset, regardless of the 
other requirements of § 1610(g).  The language and construction of 
§1610(g), the intent of Congress, and diplomatic and cultural public policy 
concerns support a narrow reading of § 1610(g).  So, likely, would Indiana 
Jones. 
 
